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Policy Research Working Paper 5361
Since 2005, donors and development agencies have 
increased the overall value of aid for trade and put in 
place several mechanisms to channel such aid and to 
ensure that it targets national priorities. This paper 
reviews recent trends in the allocation of aid for trade 
and analyses of its effectiveness. It identifies a number 
of opportunities for concerted action to enhance the 
impact of aid for trade initiatives, including greater 
involvement by middle-income countries in the initiative 
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(through improved market access, investment flows, 
and knowledge transfers); deeper engagement with the 
private sector—a key source of information on what 
works and what does not; a stronger focus on improving 
the “behind the border” policies that affect the efficiency 
of key services sectors and help determine firm-level 
competitiveness; and a stronger focus on monitoring and 
evaluation of results.0 
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Aid for Trade: Building on Progress Today for Tomorrow’s Future 
Bernard Hoekman and John S. Wilson 
 




Aid for trade is financial and technical assistance that facilitates the integration of developing 
countries into the global economy through initiatives that expand trade.  By furthering economic 
growth and development, the benefits of aid for trade are shared by all trading nations.  This 
includes not only the poor in least developed and other low-income countries, but also citizens in 
middle income countries and those in the most developed nations of the globe. Trade benefits all 
nations. 
Examples of aid for trade, as defined by the OECD
1, include the financing of transportation and 
logistics infrastructure (infrastructure is the largest share of official development assistance in aid 
for trade), assistance to help firms conform to international product standards, capacity building 
in border management, and implementation of projects that connect rural producers to markets. 
Aid for trade also spans measures to assist workers, producers and communities in adjusting to 
changes in trade policies or the terms of trade (e.g., as a result of erosion of trade preference 
programs). 
The global initiative on aid for trade was launched at the 2005 G8 meeting in Gleneagles, 
Scotland.
2  Since 2005, donors and multilateral development banks have increased the overall 
value of aid for trade and put in place several mechanisms to both channel such aid and to ensure 
that it reflects and addresses national priorities. The commitment to aid for trade has been re-
iterated repeatedly by major donors at global aid for trade review meetings hosted by the WTO 
in 2007 and 2009 and in G-8 communiqués. The G-20 Summit in London in April 2009 included 
a statement of continued support for implementation of the commitments made on aid for trade 
                                                            
1 Although the general understanding of “aid for trade” is more or less universal, there are some technical 
differences across multilateral organizations and governments as to which types of development assistance qualify 
as such.  The World Bank, for instance, takes a much narrower approach to identifying lending that is “trade-
related” and does not include infrastructure lending under this umbrella unless it is part of a project that specifically 
addresses, either directly or indirectly, the cross-border movement of goods.  On the other hand, the World Bank 
includes funds lent to countries on non-concessional terms as “trade-related lending,” whereas the official OECD 
definition of “aid for trade” includes concessional lending only (as required by the terms of Official Development 
Assistance).  For the purposes of this paper “aid for trade” refers to the official OECD definition, unless noted 
otherwise. See World Bank (2009) for a discussion of differences in OECD and World Bank approaches. 
2 See http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/16.html. At the December 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong, a new WTO Aid 
for Trade Task Force was created to provide recommendations to the WTO Director-General on how to best 
“operationalize” aid for trade.  The Ministerial Declaration also included explicit references to the importance of aid 
for trade to assist least developed countries (LDCs) “to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related 
infrastructure that they need to … implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their 
trade. WTO “Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration,” doc wt/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2, 18 December 2005. 3 
 
by members.
3 Delivering on these commitments is particularly important in the current global 
economic situation: aid for trade that results in improvements in productivity of firms and 
farmers in poor developing countries can both assist countries in recovering from the crisis and 
enhance longer-term growth and development prospects. 
By design, there is no central entity or global financial coordination mechanism that takes the 
lead on or is the focal point for delivering aid for trade.
4 Instead, aid for trade is supplied through 
existing country-based allocation mechanisms by bilateral donors and international development 
agencies. The country-centric approach helps ensure that aid targets priorities identified by 
governments. However, the recipient country-cum-donor community-centric focus of the 
initiative also limits the potential impact of the enterprise in that more can be done to involve 
other actors in the delivery and assessment of aid for trade. 
Important vehicles used to raise awareness and monitor progress in delivery of aid for trade by 
donors are the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for trade-related technical assistance to the 
least developed countries (LDCs) and regional and global aid for trade reviews co-organized by 
the WTO.
5 Since 2005, significant progress has been made by bilateral donors in implementing 
aid for trade commitments and by developing countries in identifying aid for trade priorities. 
However, there is still insufficient awareness and understanding in the broader development 
community of what the aid for trade initiative entails and how it works. There is also very limited 
data and analysis on the impact of aid for trade on the ground. 
This paper reviews recent trends in the delivery of aid for trade, its allocation and analyses of 
impact and effectiveness. It then identifies a number of opportunities for concerted action to 
enhance the impact of aid for trade initiatives. Developing mechanisms and concrete programs to 
transfer resources from middle income countries (investment, knowledge) as well as the private 
sector could do much to enhance the effectiveness of aid for trade in supporting trade and 
employment growth in low-income developing countries.  
1.  Why Aid for Trade Matters 
A key rationale for launching the aid for trade initiative was that firms in many developing 
countries may be unable to benefit from existing and prospective market access opportunities 
that the trading system or specific countries/regions offer – such as preferential (duty-free, quota-
free) market access.
6 Poor quality infrastructure and high trade and other operating and 
transactions costs in particular act to block many of the advantages of reduced barriers to trade 
                                                            
3 “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform,” http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-
communique. 
4 In contrast to other areas recently identifies as priorities for development assistance at a global level – such as the 
Global Agricultural and Food Security Program (GAFSP) established in 2009 with earmarked funding of $1 to $1.5 
billion to scale-up agricultural assistance targeted to the food security of low income countries – donors decided 
there was no need for such a mechanism in the trade area. 
5 The main objective of the EIF is to assist LDC governments in identifying trade projects that can be considered in 
the overall process of defining aid allocation priorities at the national level. There have been two global reviews to 
date, in 2007 and 2009. 
6 See Prowse (2006) and Hoekman (2007) for a discussion of the genesis and rationales for the multilateral aid for 
trade initiative. 4 
 
achieved in international and bilateral market access talks. A major feature of most aid for trade 
is that it is aimed at lowering costs and enhancing the productivity of firms in recipient countries. 
By focusing on boosting investment in infrastructure and complementary measures to create the 
preconditions for improved access to higher quality, lower cost public and private services, aid 
for trade can help countries to capture more of the benefits of existing market access 
opportunities. 
The need to deliver on aid for trade is heightened in the current economic environment. There 
are at least three reasons for this:  
  Trade is a powerful mechanism to help countries overcome the shock of the crisis. Given 
the lack of progress in bringing the WTO Doha Development Round to closure, delivery 
on aid for trade would provide an important signal that the major players in the world 
economy recognize the importance of taking actions to expand trade. 
  Aid for trade can help countries diversify into new markets and products—helping poor 
countries benefit from the emergence of a multi-growth pole world economy. 
  Aid for trade, allocated effectively, can improve productivity in recipient countries by 
lowering costs and enhancing competitiveness, thereby enhancing growth prospects. 
Trade is a channel for poor countries to recover from the downturn.  As economic activity and 
demand recovers from the financial crisis, consumers and enterprises in importing countries can 
be expected to be even more sensitive to prices of the goods and services they buy than before. 
Aid for trade that supports measures to improve the competitiveness of countries with weak trade 
capacity is therefore important.  Moreover, as fiscal and monetary stimuli are gradually 
withdrawn, aid for trade can help maintain demand for goods and services and attract investment 
in tradable activities. Thus, aid for trade can provide a boost to developing countries during a 
period when they sorely need it.
 7  It can also help reduce pressures for protectionism and 
increase support for trade reforms in developing countries, further expanding trade prospects by 
helping to keep markets open globally. 
Aid for trade can help increase diversification. Trade openness gives rise to risks as well as 
benefits. The recent crisis was exceptional in being truly global in scope: all countries were 
negatively affected. However, the crisis also illustrated once again that more diversified 
economies do better than those that rely on just a few products or markets as the source for their 
foreign exchange. Diversification can help reduce output volatility (Haddad, Lim and 
Saborowski, 2010). Many low-income countries are not well diversified – in part because of high 
trade and other costs that aid for trade can help reduce. 
Aid for trade can enhance productivity in low-income countries. There is a long-standing 
debate regarding developing countries’ capacity to effectively absorb increased aid flows.  By 
focusing on lowering trade and other transactions costs and improving the productivity of the 
                                                            
7 Even considering increased aid flows and commitments over the past several years, the World Bank estimates that 
developing countries confronted a financing shortfall of between US$270 billion and US$700 billion in 2009.  
External financing needs for developing countries are likely to increase because of the fallout of the crisis.  5 
 
economy as a whole, allocating assistance to enhance trade capacity can help avoid negative 
competitiveness spillovers generated by aid inflows such as Dutch disease and pressures for real 
appreciation. As Reis and Farole (2010) note, the post-crisis “competitiveness policy 
framework” should tackle the priorities of aligning macroeconomic incentives (e.g.: trade 
barriers, real exchange rates and labor market policies), reducing at-the-border and behind-the-
border trade costs, and overcoming government and market failures (e.g., shortages in trade 
finance, stimulating technology diffusion, improving product standards).  Aid for trade can help 
low-income countries address this agenda – without targeting specific industries or potentially 
distorting policies to support product-specific investments. It can do so by improving trade 
policy coordination; trade facilitation, skill formation, trade-related infrastructure; and 
administrative procedures (Cali and te Velde, 2008). 
2.  Trends in Aid for Trade 
What is aid for trade?  The OECD compiles statistics on official development assistance (ODA) 
in support of trade. These data distinguish between the following broad categories of support: (1) 
technical assistance for trade policy and regulations, (2) productive capacity building (including 
trade development), (3) trade-related infrastructure, and (4) trade related adjustment.  Examples 
of support to trade policy and regulatory reform include projects at the country level to 
harmonize regulations to international norms.  Capacity building and trade development include 
projects to assist in diversification of exports.  Trade-related infrastructure projects include roads, 
ports, and telecommunications network investments.  Trade adjustment assistance involves aid to 
help with costs associated with trade liberalization, including tariff reduction and preference 
erosion, for example. 
According to the data reported by the OECD, some 25 percent of ODA was directed toward aid 
for trade in 2008, and about 35 percent of aid that donors and governments allocated to particular 
sectors.
8 Bilateral donors provided low-income countries, including LDCs, with about US$15.6 
billion in aid for trade in 2008.  This amounted to some 40 percent of the total US$39 billion in 
concessional aid for trade commitments in 2008.  The LDCs received about one-fourth of aid for 
trade commitments.  Donors provided about half of aid for trade commitments to middle income 
countries, mostly from bilateral sources. 
The supply of aid for trade has increased over the 2002/2005-2008 period by 21 percent in real 
terms. Low-income countries saw their share of total aid for trade increase from 44 to 54 percent, 
while 59 percent (US$ 4.7 billion) of the additional funds went to Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD 
and WTO, 2009). It is important to note that the OECD definition of aid for trade that is used 
here is a very broad measure of trade-related assistance and therefore overstates the overall 
magnitude of aid for trade.  It includes all financing of infrastructure with the exception of water 
and sanitation projects. As infrastructure accounts for a large share of total ODA expenditures, 
this inflates the aggregate numbers for aid for trade. The reason for the use of a wide definition is 
                                                            
8 This “sectoral allocable aid” excludes funds for debt relief, administrative costs and budget support, as well as 
resources that are allocated to support trade finance. The G20 mobilized a collective US$250 billion effort to 
support trade finance during the crisis. Access to such finance is an important determinant of the costs of trade and 
the ability of exporters to operate. 6 
 
that it is very difficult to distinguish to what extent specific forms of infrastructure support trade 
as opposed to non-tradable activities.
9  
Trends in aid for trade declined in absolute terms through 2002, after which it rose, reflecting 
renewed donor interest in growth and developments such as the launch of the Doha Development 
round (Figure 1). Even so, aid for trade has not kept pace with either total development 
assistance or that portion allocated to particular activities. Multilateral providers of assistance – 
aid that is channeled through IDA and the regional development banks – on average allocated a 
far higher proportion of their concessional aid for trade assistance to low-income countries than 
do bilateral donors.  Some 93 percent of every aid for trade dollar goes to low-income countries 
($6.6 billion of a total of $7.1 billion in assistance – Figure 2).  However, bilateral donors 
provided 46 percent of their aid for trade to low-income countries.  This highlights the 
importance of multilateral concessional lending for trade – and the urgency from an aid for trade 
perspective – of successfully completing the replenishment of the International Development 
Association’s concessional fund for low-income countries (IDA-16).
10  
Figure 1: Aid for Trade, 1995-2008 (constant, 2008 USD Million) 
 
Source: OECD CRS database. 
According to the OECD’s most recent comprehensive report on aid for trade, Asia is the largest 
recipient of aid for trade.  Aid to Africa has been closing in year-by-year in second place.  In 
2007, Asia received US$10.7 billion, over half of which went to Central and South Asia.  
Although the volume of aid for trade funds destined for Asia remained stable from 2002 to 2007, 
the region’s share of total aid for trade funds dropped from 50 percent in the 2002-2005 period to 
42 percent in 2007.  This is due, in part, to Africa’s increasing share of global aid for trade funds.  
The region received US$9.5 billion in 2007, representing 38 percent of total aid for trade funds, 
up from 30 percent in the baseline period.  Flows to all other regions were significantly smaller. 
                                                            
9 It should also be noted that the OECD/WTO numbers exclude development assistance provided outside of the 
framework of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and thus do not cover assistance provided by 
countries such as China. 
10 Note: When references are made to CRS data, USD figures are in 2008 constant terms, whereas statistics 













Latin America received US$2 billion and Oceania received US$1.6 billion in this period.  Europe 
received the least, at US$1.2 billion, and was the only region to register a decrease in aid for 
trade funds from the baseline period to 2007 (OECD/WTO, 2009). 
Multilateral providers of assistance – aid that is channeled through IDA and the regional 
development banks – on average allocated a far higher proportion of their concessional aid for 
trade assistance to low-income countries than do bilateral donors.  Some 93 percent of every aid 
for trade dollar goes to low-income countries (about $6.6 billion of a total of $7.1 billion in 
assistance).  Bilateral donors gave 46 percent of their aid for trade to low-income countries.   
Figure 2: Aid for Trade by recipient group, bilateral vs. multilateral donors 
 
Note: Commitments in 2008 to low income (IDA eligible) countries. 
Source: OECD CRS database. 
 
The increased focus on the trade agenda by developing countries is also reflected in an expansion 
in trade-related activities and investments by the World Bank Group.  A recent review of World 
Bank country assistance strategies (CASs) found that trade is now on the agenda of the majority 
(65 percent) of the Bank’s clients (Strachan, 2009).  These CASs identify trade as an important 
priority and present assistance programs with a clear focus on one or more of the following 
thematic areas:  regional integration, export diversification, trade facilitation, and market access. 
This is translating into increased operational support, through ESW, lending, and in some cases, 
technical assistance to help countries achieve their medium term objectives. World Bank trade-
related lending – using the World Bank’s narrower definition vis-à-vis aid for trade – more than 
doubled since 2002, rising to some $1.4 billion in 2008 from about $550 million in 2002 (Figure 
3). Concessional lending to the public sector has increased by more than half (World Bank, 




























been declining in recent years, illustrating that expanding aid for trade continues to require high-
level attention by policymakers. 
Figure 3: Trends in World Bank Trade Lending, 2001–2009 
 
 
Source: SAP/Business Warehouse. 
Notes: Trade components are defined by thematic codes assigned to IDA and IBRD projects. The increase in value of 
lending in 2009 comes from a $2.125 billion Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor Project. 
The rise in aid for trade has occurred against the backdrop of success in reducing import tariffs 
and removal of other traditional barriers to trade.  This is true even considering the long stalled 
Doha negotiations at the WTO.  As formal trade barriers have been eliminated for a significant 
portion of global trade, countries have focused on other impediments to trade flows – both 
through domestic and collective action. Global trade reform and capacity building is increasingly 
anchored in an agenda to minimize trade transaction costs to further leverage comparative and 
competitive advantages.  This shift in the global trade agenda has been accompanied by a 
significant increase in aid for trade assistance from bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. 
As discussed further below, achieving better targeted – and effective – aid for trade would 
benefit from a less ad hoc multilateral framework for coordination. It is clear, however, that there 
is a large supply of aid for trade assistance, the majority of which is provided by multilateral 
institutions and G20 donor countries. The G-20 is well placed to lead in this regard. In 2007, of 
the top fifteen non-institutional donors of aid for trade ODA, eight are G20 members, including 
the European Communities (OECD and WTO, 2009). The G20 therefore has an opportunity to 
provide strong and visible global leadership, in partnership with multilateral institutions and 
developing countries, to shape the aid for trade agenda going forward.  Commitments to sustain 
and grow aid for trade commitments at recent summits have been encouraging,
11 but there is a 
need for a more direct and visible approach in ensuring concrete action plans on aid for trade to 
help drive the development agenda forward as global recovery continues.   
 
                                                            
11 See “Global plan for recovery and reform,” communiqué issued at the close of the G20 London Summit, April 2, 
2009. At: http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-communique. 9 
 
3.  Does Supply of Aid for Trade Match Demand? 
The distribution of aid for trade is as important as overall amounts.  There are a number of 
different perspectives on the question of whether the supply of aid for trade aligns with the 
demand and need for aid. One approach is to focus on analysis of poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRSPs) to evaluate whether and how countries are integrating trade policy and 
institutional reforms into development plans.  A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
study that reviewed 72 PRSPs found that 85 percent included one or more components devoted 
to trade (Kosack, 2008).  This marks a significant increase from previous analyses – a 2000 study 
found only about 25 percent of completed PRSPs had a section relating to trade. Moreover, 52 of 
the 72 PRSPs included in the latest UNDP study related trade policies to poverty profiles.  This 
development, among other more specific differences across various iterations of PRSPs, suggests 
that countries are increasingly considering linkages between trade and poverty reduction.  The 
same can be inferred from the survey of World Bank Country Assistance Strategies mentioned 
earlier. 
One of the first attempts to evaluate the balance between supply and demand based on empirical 
evidence and data was undertaken by Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009). They find that supply 
of aid for trade has responded to demand in the sense that countries that are most in need of aid 
for trade – as measured by trade capacity and performance – tend to receive relatively more 
assistance.  Subsequent analysis that builds on and extends the methodology developed by 
Gamberoni and Newfarmer has focused on the relative impact of hard versus soft infrastructure 
investments, aiming to obtain a better understanding where aid for trade funds may be best spent 
in advancing capacity building goals. For example, Portugal-Pérez and Wilson (2010a) construct 
indicators of trade capacity from a set of primary variables that measure the availability and 
quality of trade-related infrastructure and regulation (e.g., the fixed line network, quality and 
capacity of ports, airports, rail, and roads, governance and corruption, costs and time to clear 
trade consignments, various indicators of the business and investment climate, etc.). Using factor 
analysis, these variables are condensed into four specific factors that capture distinct features of 
the trade environment. Two of these indicators are related to the “hard dimension” of trade 
capacity – Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Physical Infrastructure – and 
the other two are measures of the “soft” dimension of trade capacity: a Business Environment 
Trade Indicator and a Border Management and Customs Efficiency Indicator. 
Martinez and Wilson (2010) use these four factors to create a measure of the demand (need) for 
aid for trade.  The authors regress actual supply of aid for trade against this measure and find that 
most of the countries that have the greatest need are close or above the predicted line, indicating 
an approximate match between supply and demand (Figure 4). Moreover, the results are 
consistent in the sense that countries with the lowest scores on the trade capacity indicator 
(associated with higher values of the Index), receive higher levels of aid for trade. However, it is 
also clear that there is a lot of variance around the trend, and that many countries are receiving 
less support than these various indicators of need suggest would be appropriate.  
  10 
 
Figure 4: Matching Demand with Supply of Aid for Trade 
 
Source: Martinez and Wilson (2010). 
 
4.  Aid for Trade: Impacts and Effectiveness 
There is an extensive literature analyzing the relationship between aid and economic growth. The 
analytical methods employed in these studies and the results are subject to significant debate. 
The literature provides a mixed picture as to whether there is a positive relationship between aid 
and growth.
12 There may be many reasons for this. It may be due to the type of aid delivered (for 
example, purely humanitarian vs. policy change driven) or reflect differences in absorptive 
capacity in developing countries.
 13 One factor that can explain a lack of a positive relationship 
between aid and growth is aid-induced appreciation of real exchange rates—with aid inflows 
inducing Dutch disease.
14 A comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  It is useful, however, to outline, in brief, the complexities in analyzing and understanding 
                                                            
12 See Rajan and Subramanian (2005) for a survey and new assessment; Cali and te Velde (2009) for a synthesis of 
the extant literature. 
13 See Radelet, Clemens, Bhavnani (2006), OECD (2006). 
14 The effect is well known: aid flows may be used to finance expenditures of non-tradable goods and services, 
leading to a rise of their relative price with respect to tradable goods and thus, to a real appreciation of the exchange 
rate. This reduces the competitiveness of the exporting sector, as resources are transferred from the tradable to non-
tradable sectors and drives up wages and other input costs. Estimates of whether aid induces a Dutch disease 
phenomenon can vary widely. Much depends on assumptions about the marginal productivity of additional aid and 
public expenditures, the complementarities between public and private capital, and the degree of flexibility of labor 
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the relationships between aid, trade, and growth. Debate continues, in particular, on the causality 
between aid and trade.
 15 
Until the late 1990s a large share of ODA was tied to trade in the sense that procurement of 
goods and services financed by aid was tied to sourcing from the donor country. Any positive 
trade-aid relationship, therefore, could be due to policy decisions made in donor countries.  
Many researchers have indeed found strong links between foreign aid and donor exports.
16 
Causality could also run the other direction—from trade to aid—insofar as donors allocate aid to 
those countries that they have the strongest trade ties with.
17 Analyses that test for the direction 
of causality generally conclude that it depends on the pair of donor and recipient countries.
18  
Whatever the precise channels, the results suggest a positive relationship between aid and trade. 
In light of the commitments and action to increase aid for trade funding, questions as to how aid 
for trade specifically helps to improve the trading performance of developing countries – and 
how effective taxpayer funding is in attaining aid for trade objectives – have gained increased 
prominence. This is especially true in a post-crisis environment characterized by a much tighter 
fiscal situation in all donor countries. Bilateral donors and international development agencies 
are actively engaged in efforts to go beyond simple monitoring of the flows and allocations of 
aid for trade to an assessment and/or analysis of the impact of aid for trade. 
Evaluation is critical to discovering ways to improve the effectiveness of development assistance 
– and aid for trade is no exception.  Evaluation can occur at several levels: do countries in need 
get it (the question asked above), are programs taken as a whole effective in expanding output 
and reducing poverty (programmatic evaluations), are projects achieving their stated goals, say in 
expanding electric power (project evaluation), and are outcomes different than in comparable 
situations without the project or different than they would have been in the absence of project 
interventions (impact evaluation).   
Measuring the impact of aid for trade is challenging. In part this is because of data limitations. 
Many projects may not have information on defined baselines against which impacts can be 
assessed. Trade-related development projects often lag behind best practice in not being designed 
to allow rigorous ex post evaluation of impacts. A major challenge is that often standard impact 
evaluation methods cannot be applied to aid for trade because the assistance takes the form of 
general budget support. Frequently it will be difficult to disentangle the impact of aid for trade 
projects and programs on welfare, income, and equity (e.g., distributional effects).  
Much of the assessment of aid for trade to date has been at an aggregated level, focusing on 
whether trade performance of countries and indicators of trade capacity have improved. What is 
                                                            
15 Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007) provide a comprehensive review of this topic.  
16 For example, Nilsson (1997) observes for trade between the EU and recipient countries that $1 of aid generated 
$2.6 of exports from donor to recipient for the period 1975 to 1992. Wagner finds that increasing aid to a country by 
1 % increases the donor exports to the recipient by 1.33 %. Other researchers have explored additional links that 
may exist between the donor and recipient that may lead to additional trade, such as political or economic 
considerations (Lloyd et al., 2000). Nelson and Silva (2008) is a recent analysis that obtains much smaller number 
using a fixed effects gravity model estimation.  
17Morrissey, 1993; Osei et al., 2004.  
18Lloyd et al. (2000) as well as Arvin et al. (2000).   12 
 
needed is more detailed analysis of the impact of specific aid for trade interventions on the 
ground, which in turn will depend on identifying new ways to support long-term investment in 
micro-level trade cost and outcome data.  
A recent OECD review of project evaluations for trade-related development assistance projects 
found that project documents often had insufficiently clear measurable objectives (OECD 2006).  
Quantitative baselines or benchmarks that would allow ex post assessments of the degree of 
improvement in specific measures of trade performance or trade capacity were frequently not 
included. This is an important finding in itself because it implies that donors and beneficiaries 
have to do a better job in identifying objectives.  The OECD report concludes that, in half of the 
evaluations, trade-related assistance contributed to raising awareness of the importance of trade 
and knowledge of trade issues, while helping to strengthen country dialogues on trade policy.  
Major project weaknesses that were identified included inadequate needs assessments, weak 
project management and governance, a lack of integration into an overall trade strategy or 
development program, weak links to poverty reduction, inadequate donor coordination, and 
inadequate communication to, and expertise in, field missions. 
A 2006 evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Group of World Bank trade projects and 
programs found that  in general trade-related adjustment loans performed better than other 
adjustment loans (86 percent satisfactory versus 78 percent for non trade loans), while trade-
related investment loans performed slightly worse (69 percent versus 72 percent satisfactory) 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). A follow up review found that in 2007, more than 85 
percent of projects were evaluated to have had moderately satisfactory, satisfactory or highly 
satisfactory outcomes. These generally performed better than non-aid for trade projects (World 
Bank, 2009). 
More programmatic forms of evaluation use cross-country data on the effects of increasing aid 
for trade in specific areas.  Given that aid for trade is targeted at specific types of activities and 
interventions a more precise identification strategy can be employed to assess the magnitude of 
effects and direction of causality.  
Cali and te Velde (2008, 2009) analyze the effects of various categories of aid for trade and find 
that aid for trade facilitation reduces the cost of trading. A US$1 million increase in aid for trade 
facilitation projects is associated with a 6% reduction in the cost of packing goods, loading them 
into a container and transporting the consignment to the port of departure and loading them on a 
vessel or truck. They also demonstrate that aid for trade allocated to infrastructure results in an 
expansion of exports, especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors, with effects being the 
greatest in Africa where infrastructure is weak. However, aid for trade that is allocated to 
productive capacity (as opposed to infrastructure or facilitation) has no statistically significant 
effect on exports. 
Helble, Mann, and Wilson (2009) undertake a similar analysis, focusing on the effects of trade 
development assistance (productive capacity building), trade policy assistance, and infrastructure 
assistance on bilateral trade flows, using a gravity regression framework. The findings suggest 
there are very high marginal returns to aid for trade targeted at trade policy and regulatory reform 
projects: $1 dollar of aid for trade targeted at trade policy and regulatory reform is estimated to 13 
 
increase trade flows by some $700.  While aid allocated in this area will encounter diminishing 
returns, this type of analysis suggests that the rate of return to aid for trade can be very high.  
As noted, impact evaluation is still an incipient endeavor in the aid for trade field – work of this 
type is far more limited than in health and other fields of development assistance. A recent 
example is Brenton and von Uexkull (2009), who undertook an impact evaluation for export 
development projects targeted on specific export products. They found that such projects: (a) 
have coincided with, or predated, stronger export performance in the targeted commodities; (b) 
have had a greater impact on export growth for products with initially high export levels than on 
those with low export levels (although this may be because technical assistance is directed 
towards industries that are already set to take off); and (c) were likely to be more successful if 
they addressed specific market failures or policy shortcomings in activities in which the country 
had a long-run capacity for global competitiveness (as was the case in Rwanda’s donor-
supported strategy to move into the high quality, specialty end of the coffee market). 
They conclude that, done well, export development programs can succeed: cut flowers had been 
a growing export industry in Uganda for a decade when an export development program was 
started in 2003. Following the program, export value almost tripled within one year.  Although 
other Ugandan exports also rose strongly at this time, cut flowers significantly increased their 
export share.  In the case of Mongolia, a traditional exporter of wool products, exports had 
declined and lost share in the export portfolio in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After the 
implementation of an Export Development program in 2003, exports of wool products entered a 
steady growth path, outperforming overall export growth in 2005.
19  
Taken together, the available literature tends to validate central Paris Principles:  aid for trade 
can be effective, provided that countries own the program and incorporate trade objectives 
thoroughly into their development strategies.  Nearly all bilateral and multilateral organizations 
are working to improve effectiveness, but not all have recent, comprehensive evaluations of their 
programs.
20  With more than 40 bilateral and multilateral agencies involved in trade-related 
technical assistance, the scope for learning from each other is great.
21 
5.  Challenges and Priorities Looking Ahead 
Ensuring timely and continued disbursements of existing aid for trade commitments to 
developing countries should be the first priority to guarantee the uninterrupted implementation of 
ongoing aid for trade programs, thereby helping developing countries mitigate some of the 
effects of the economic crisis and benefit more fully from the ongoing recovery in trade. We 
                                                            
19 See also Freund and Pierola (2010) for some anecdotal discussion of the effects of aid on export diversification in 
Peru. 
20 Four important bilateral donors have undertaken evaluations of aid for trade programs relatively recently: USAID, 
DFID, SIDA, and the Netherlands. 
21 The OECD is the primary focal point for efforts to enhance monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade projects and 
programs. Donors involved in providing assistance for trade-related analysis or programs include the International 
Trade Centre (Geneva), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations 
Development Program, the World Bank, the Enhanced Integrated Framework, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the World Customs Organization, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, as well as regional development banks and many bilateral donors. 14 
 
argue, in what follows, that there are a number of areas where collective action by the G20 can 
enhance the effectiveness of aid for trade as an instrument to promote inclusive growth. 
 
1.  Leveraging investments in infrastructure: The services “software” agenda 
An increasing number of countries identify infrastructure as a regional priority, as revealed by 
the self-assessment questionnaires carried out for the OECD-WTO (2009) report. As noted 
above, infrastructure is the largest category of aid for trade: infrastructure projects account for 
about 54% of the global aid for trade portfolio.  Recent research has found evidence on the 
potential gains to investment in hard infrastructure, including improved export performance 
(Francois and Manchin, 2008). There is also evidence of a significant potential for reduced trade 
transaction costs and increased consumer welfare from investment in infrastructure, such as new 
ports (Abe and Wilson 2009). Investment in infrastructure may also have a greater impact in 
countries with lower per capita income in terms of generating a higher marginal impact on export 
performance (Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2010a).   
Investment in infrastructure must be accompanied by measures that reduce trade costs (Hoekman 
and Nicita, 2010) and by appropriate regulation – for instance, policies that promote competition 
in transport services and improvements in border management.
22 The quality of public and 
private services can be an important determinant of the size of the payoffs to improvements in 
hard infrastructure. More generally, the efficiency, variety and costs of services inputs are critical 
for the competitiveness of firms and farmers because they represent an important share of the 
total costs of production. Being able to compete in international markets is increasingly 
determined by access to low-cost and high- quality producer services such as 
telecommunications, transport and distribution, and finance. Policies that raise operating costs or 
preclude innovation therefore can be very detrimental to the performance of the national 
economy. Policy reforms that revolve around increasing the contestability of services markets, 
facilitating new entry and the supply of new service products are also cheap in financial terms—
they often do not require massive investments in hardware. 
Developing countries tend to have more and higher barriers to services trade and investment, as 
shown by the negative correlation between GDP per capita and the restrictiveness of services 
trade and investment policies as measured in Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) (Figure 5). Removing 
such restrictions can generate substantial benefits, leading to lower cost and higher quality 
producer services for firms and farmers in these countries.  Global outsourcing and integration 
into international value chains increasing depend on having access to a variety of services.  An 
increasing body of research demonstrates that reforms in services sectors has a positive effect on 
the productivity of both foreign –and locally owned manufacturing firms that use services inputs 
(see Francois and Hoekman, 2010 for a recent survey of the literature).  
  
                                                            
22 Raballand and Teravaninthorn (2009) find that a lack of competition in trucking in West and Central Africa 
results in higher transport prices and lower quality of services compared to more contestable Africa markets. 15 
 
Figure 5: Services trade restrictiveness Index 
+ 
A noteworthy feature of the pattern of services trade and investment policies is that landlocked 
countries apply more restrictive policies than coastal countries.  This appears particularly true in 
the air transport and telecom sectors, in which landlocked countries have no inherent 
disadvantage (Borchert, Gootiiz, Grover, and Mattoo 2010).  While there are many reasons why 
being landlocked might lead to lower availability of services and higher prices, restrictive 
policies contribute to the poor performance in services sectors, beyond the handicap imposed by 
geography. This suggests that supporting policy reforms to enhance the contestability of 
“backbone” services in landlocked countries could be a priority area for aid for trade.  
To date, however, much of the aid for trade effort has put the emphasis on support for hard 
infrastructure and improving productive capacity. Less has been done to improve the services-
related policies and regulation that help determine the efficiency of (cost of using) infrastructure 
networks.  This is one area where the support and leadership of the G-20 can make a difference. 
There are two dimensions to this: (i) ensuring that aid for trade assistance includes an adequate 
focus on pro-competitive regulation and other policies that affect the functioning of producer 
service markets (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2007); and (ii) doing more to provide access to the 
knowledge and experience on these matters that exists in the middle-income, emerging market 
members of the G20, as well as developed economies.  
Focusing explicitly on improving the operation and efficiency of services sectors is important in 
itself from a development perspective, but is also important from a global perspective. As argued 
by Claessens, Evenett and Hoekman (2010) and Hoekman and Messerlin (2010), rebalancing the 
world economy – reducing large current account surpluses and deficits – will require 
improvements in productivity (competitiveness) and domestic absorption in deficit and surplus 
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countries, respectively. In practice this cannot be achieved through monetary, fiscal and 
exchange rate policies alone – it will require changes in the structure of economies, including 
action to increase the availability, variety and quality of services inputs.  
2.  Expanding South-South integration through trade reform and market access 
Another area where the G-20 can provide important leadership is through expanded market 
access – especially for the least developed countries – led by reform in middle income countries 
to expand trading opportunities in a south-south context.  This would provide an opportunity to 
low-income economies both to expand trade, and, as importantly, help them diversify across a 
larger number of markets. 
South-South trade has been growing rapidly in recent years as a result of high rates of economic 
growth that were achieved by many developing countries. The BRIC countries, for example, 
have an import share of 12 percent (2008) compared to just 6 percent in 1996.  Meanwhile, high-
income countries’ share of import demand decreased from 81 percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 
2008 (Haddad and Hoekman 2010). 
Significant trade barriers remain in many of the dynamic emerging markets. The emphasis in 
policy forums such as the WTO has been on developed country market access conditions, 
including achieving duty-free, quota-free access for the LDCs and addressing key constraints 
that reduce the value of preferential access such as rules of origin. While this is important, it 
arguably represents a missed opportunity for low-income developing countries that confront high 
barriers against exports in middle-income countries. 
Fugazza and Vanzetti (2008) compare the potential effects of the removal of barriers on South-
South trade with the gains from developed country liberalization and from regional free trade 
areas within Africa, Asia and Latin America using a general equilibrium model, GTAP.  Their 
simulations indicate that the opening up of northern markets would provide annual welfare gains 
to developing countries of $22 billion. However, the removal of South-South barriers has the 
potential to generate gains 60 per cent larger. The results imply that giving greater emphasis to 
removing barriers between developing countries could give a significant boost to trade with low-
income countries.  
Overall, research suggests that whereas traditionally the bulk of South–North trade flows were in 
less sophisticated sectors with fewer learning opportunities; this may not be the case today, 
particularly among the dynamic Asian economies. Klinger (2009) studies the composition of 
South–South as opposed to South–North trade in recent years to consider whether the South as a 
market provides developing countries with greater opportunities to transform their productive 
structures and move to more sophisticated export sectors than the Northern market does. His 
results show that for many developing countries, including in Africa and Central Asia, exports 
within the South are more sophisticated and better connected in the product space than exports to 
the North, whereas the opposite is true for the faster-growing economies of Asia and Eastern 
Europe (excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States). Klinger also finds that the 
primary source of cross-country variation in export sophistication and connectedness is between 
northbound rather than southbound export baskets.  17 
 
Post-crisis projections are that middle-income markets will grow more rapidly than those of 
high-income countries. The emergence of multiple growth poles in the South offers low-income 
countries an opportunity to diversify both across markets and products given that developing 
country consumers have differentiated preferences and demand. Moreover, increased South-
South trade reduces the exposure of developing countries to possible prolonged slow growth 
markets in Europe, Japan, and the United States.  It also mitigates risk associated with increased 
market openness and trade-led growth through product and good diversification effects, as 
mentioned above. 
South-South trade has already increased at the extensive and the intensive margins. Exports of 
LMICs to BRICs rose from 7 percent of the total in 2000 to 12 percent in 2008 (Figure 6). The 
average value of a transaction from LMICs to BRICs increased 444 percent during the 1996-
2008 period, while that from LMICs to HICs rose only 180 percent. However, developing 
countries still export substantially fewer varieties than high-income or even middle-income 
countries – there is therefore great scope for further diversification (Figure 7).  
Middle-income emerging markets also are a source of knowledge and FDI – which in turn can 
drive additional trade growth in low-income economies. Harnessing these opportunities is in part 
a function of putting in place the appropriate policies – including removal of market access 
barriers. If all OECD countries were to offer 100 percent DFQF, exports of the LDCs could 
increase by up to $2 billion more than they would under a 97 percent scenario (Bouët et al., 
2010). But these export gains would be greater still if major middle-income nations were to offer 
DFQF access to LDCs—by up to $5 billion – reflecting higher tariffs in these countries. To be 
effective, such improved market access needs to be accompanied by liberal rules of origin and 
related administrative requirements. 
Figure 6: Developing Countries Account for 
an Increasing Share of World Trade 
(percent share of world trade) 
Figure 7: Southern Countries Still Export 
Fewer Varieties Than Northern Ones 
(average number of exported varieties at 6-digit HS) 
Source: Haddad and Hoekman (2010), drawing on UN-COMTRADE data. 
Note: LICs=low-income countries; LMICs=lower middle-income countries; UMICs=upper middle-income 




3.  Supporting regional cooperation and integration of markets: Capacity building 
 
Although much (most) of the aid for trade agenda is national in scope, there has been a recent 
rise in the demand for assistance to support regional integration.  One factor driving this is a 
recognition that key constraints to a country’s competitiveness may lie outside its borders.  This 
is most directly the case for landlocked countries. There are a number of common priorities for 
regional integration in areas such as transport infrastructure, road corridors, energy and water, 
and trade facilitation.  Efforts to integrate neighboring markets for goods, services and factors of 
production (workers, investment) can help stimulate South-South trade by reducing trade costs 
and allowing economies of scale to be realized. Much of the agenda here revolves around 
initiatives to lower transactions and operating costs for firms on both side of the border. 
Lowering such costs in a cooperative (joint) manner does not give rise to the types of welfare-
reducing trade diversion that can arise from preferential reduction of tariffs: lower trade costs 
benefit all trade partners – they facilitate trade with the rest of the world as well as with 
neighbors.
23   
There is evidence of the benefits of strengthened regional cooperation.  The Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) agenda on trade provides one example.  Increased transparency 
can have a positive impact on trade and welfare. Based on a computable general equilibrium 
model, Abe and Wilson (2008) find that trade in APEC countries would increase by 11 percent 
and global welfare would expand by $406 billion by reform aiming at raising transparency to the 
average level in the region.   
The simulations suggest that most of the increase in welfare would take place in member 
economies undertaking reform. Among the reformers, the GDP of Vietnam, Thailand, Russia, 
and the Philippines would increase approximately 20 percent. There is also evidence to suggest 
that reform in some of the poorest regions of the world could generate substantial benefits.  
Improvements in trade facilitation indicators in Africa, for example, to cut trade costs half-way 
to the best performer in the region for Ethiopia is roughly equivalent to a 7.6% average cut in 
tariffs faced by Ethiopian exporters in export markets (Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2009). 
Cooperation at the regional level poses specific challenges in that the costs and benefits of 
projects can be very asymmetrical, with most of the required investments (and thus costs) 
accruing to a country that gets relatively little benefit from the investment. As this can greatly 
reduce support for regional projects that are critical to landlocked developing countries, one 
rationale for aid for trade is to increase the incentives for joint action in areas where benefits are 
distributed asymmetrically across countries.  
For example, landlocked developing countries in Africa, in which more than a quarter of the 
continent’s population lives, face a substantial competitive disadvantage due to high trade costs 
(Djankov et al, 2006; Raballand and Teravaninthorn, 2009; Arvis and Raballand, 2010; Arvis et 
al. 2010).  These countries also tend to have lower levels of foreign direct investment.   
Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2010b) explore the relationship of trade costs and incoming FDI into 
developing countries, including landlocked ones. Preliminary estimates show a negative 
relationship between trade costs and FDI in a North-South context. Indeed, most incoming FDI 
                                                            
23 As has been discussed extensively in the literature on regionalism, it is important that policy not target an 
expansion in intra-regional trade per se as a policy objective. What matters is to reduce barriers to trade generally, 
and regional agreements can help do so – especially for land-locked countries.  19 
 
in developing countries finance operations entailing the transport of goods across borders, as in 
extracting industries, or in industries exporting goods intensive in low-skilled labor. In that 
context, they argue that domestic trade costs can be seen as a tax on operations and have an 
impact on FDI attractiveness.  
Landlocked developing countries are particularly affected as they tend to have higher export 
costs than their coastal neighbors. For these states, domestic problems are multiplied by those 
prevailing in transit/coastal countries through negative spillover effects. But there are also 
externalities for coastal countries: a nationally focused strategy often will not be sufficient to 
maximize trade and growth opportunities if neighboring markets are ignored. Policy reforms and 
actions that can lead to significant improvement of the business environment and attract 
investment are of a public good nature: the associated outputs are non-excludable (it is difficult 
to prevent countries who may not have contributed to its provision from using it) and non-rival in 
consumption (use by a neighboring country does not affect the supply or quality of the good); 
hence the need for a collective action solution at a regional level.  
The need for regional cooperation is understood by all stakeholders. However, the range of 
available instruments to support regional projects and cooperation is limited.  This results in the 
under-provision of financing/assistance for multi-country trade-related projects (Hoekman and 
Njinkeu, 2010). Weak capacity of existing regional secretariats and pro-reform civil society 
groups, and the diffuse nature of the benefits of existing integration mechanisms for the private 
sector have also resulted in a poor implementation track record. Moving the regional integration 
agenda ahead requires addressing frontally the political economy of regional cooperation and 
coordination by increasing the incentives for implementation. This requires engagement on 
different fronts, with a reward/incentive scheme that targets all relevant actors – national 
governments, sub-national entities, and non-state actors. 
Dedicated funds to support regional cooperation, covering both “software” (regulatory 
institutions, policy changes) and hardware (infrastructure to support cross-country flows of 
goods, services and people) could help to fill the gap that currently exists. A concerted focus on 
identifying and financing regional projects that would help to address the national priorities 
could also help overcome resistance to beneficial regional market integration (beneficial in the 
sense of helping to attain the competitiveness objective). A practical way forward would be for a 
greater proportion of donor funds for aid for trade to be allocated to regional projects and 
programs.
24  Most regional and multilateral institutions already have trust funds through which 
such resources could be channeled. 
4.  Harnessing the private sector as a source of knowledge, capital and information 
Given the broad nature of the aid for trade agenda – encompassing areas from border 
management to regulatory reform and infrastructure investment – there is a sizeable number of 
stakeholders involved from both the public and private sectors.  As such, there is great scope to 
                                                            
24 While proposals for earmarked funds are controversial, as earmarking can be inconsistent with aid effectiveness 
(the activities for which funding is earmarked may not be a priority in individual countries), the creation of a 
mechanism that earmarks an overall amount for trade does not need to imply that countries must identify trade as a 
priority; it simply provides greater credibility to countries that if they decide that trade projects are a priority, 
development assistance will be available. 20 
 
make effective use of public-private partnerships that capitalize on private sector expertise in 
prioritizing areas for reform and identifying potential solutions. 
Different models have proliferated at the national level, an example being national trade 
facilitation associations that work to connect stakeholders in the public and private spheres in 
order to carry out work at a broad national level, or in specialized areas such as border 
management reform (e.g., TradeNet of Singapore and Tradelink of Hong Kong, China).
25  These 
networks serve as important platforms for developing national strategies and action plans for 
reform, in addition to providing stakeholders with a mechanism for coordination and 
harmonization of policy measures across industries and sectors. More generally, the private 
sector is already undertaking numerous initiatives to address concrete problems or to leverage 
ongoing investments to enhance development impacts.  Examples are the Global Facilitation 
Partnership, a network of logistics companies and international agencies working on trade and 
transport (see http://www.gfptt.org/), growth corridor initiatives that are supported by Yara 
International in Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania, the Business Action for Africa network which has 
various focused initiatives such as the alliance for Improving Customs Administration in Africa, 
and the Private Investors for Africa coalition. 
Many countries have also put in place annual or more frequent mechanisms through which 
political leaders meet with the domestic private sector to discuss concerns and identify priorities 
for (joint) action. Much more can and should be done to harness the knowledge and information 
that exists in the private sector, both as a source of data on constraints to trade and policies or 
factors that needlessly increase costs of trading, and as a source of potential solutions to specific 
problems. Greater sharing of information on such initiatives and learning about what works and 
what does not would enhance the visibility of such efforts and boost the role of the private sector 
in the broader aid for trade program.
26 
5.  Bolstering monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of aid for trade 
Effective monitoring of delivery of aid for trade and the extent to which it responds to national 
priorities as defined by recipient governments is important to allow accurate assessments and 
evaluation of outcomes.  Most donors monitor and evaluate their aid for trade programs in 
accordance with generic evaluation guidelines or with specific guidelines for themes and sectors 
falling under aid for trade (see OECD/WTO Donor Questionnaire).   
More learning could be generated by applying, whenever possible, the kind of impact-evaluation 
methods now widely used in the evaluation of poverty, health and education projects. The 
essence of these methods consists of using control groups to benchmark the improvement in the 
                                                            
25 See UNESCAP,“Trade & Investment Issues, Aid for Trade and Public-Private Partnerships” 
E/ESCAP/CMG(4/I)/2, 3 July 2007. 
26 The World Bank is developing a new Public-Private Partnership on Aid for Trade Facilitation as a platform for an 
exchange of information and learning in the area of trade facilitation. The project will design and implement 
practical and achievable trade facilitation projects that lower trade costs by addressing the lack of capacity of 
developing countries to rapidly move goods and services across borders. A central focus of the work will be to 
improve the “software” of trade logistics and border management to complement and enhance hard infrastructure 
investments.  In addition, the partnership will leverage private sector expertise in producing real-time trade 
performance data, which may be used to encourage policy-oriented trade facilitation reform.  21 
 
performance of individuals “treated” by particular programs. Clearly, not all trade-related 
programs can be amenable to such “treatment-effect” methodologies. The easiest are export-
promotion programs that target individual firms..
27  
Even in the limited areas where their application is relatively straightforward, applications of 
“clinical” impact evaluation methods to trade-related programs have so far been limited. They 
provide no evaluation of spillover effects—even though spillovers are key to the justification of 
public intervention. Moreover, like all clinical impact evaluations, they have uncertain “external 
validity”, as what works in one setting may not work in another. Notwithstanding these and other 
caveats that have been extensively discussed in the literature (Rodrik 2008), they offer a valuable 
tool to understand what works and what does not. In particular, when carefully thought out, they 
can help identify which components of assistance programs work best. That is, beyond their 
contribution to general accountability, they have the power to generate useful knowledge to 
renew the factual basis on which to base policy advice and donor practice.  
Investment in data and analysis should span work at both the macro and micro levels.  An agenda 
in this area must center on a framework for rigorous evaluation of aid-for trade-projects, 
empirical research on aid impact evaluation, drawing on macro datasets from the CRS OECD 
databases and micro-data from projects that are implemented by development agencies.  Country 
and/or regional analyses of aid for trade effectiveness are needed to assess how types of aid for 
trade funds are spent in relation to their returns, as measured by increased trade flows, lower 
trade costs, etc. Data on trade costs could be collected from a variety of sources, including trade 
support institutions, customs authorities, and international transport companies.  Detailed data 
will be needed to assess policies related to specific aid for trade interventions – e.g. support for 
industrial upgrading, certification of firms (ISO 9000), or technical assistance for transport 
logistics (Wilson, 2010). 
At the country- and regional level, the private sector has an important role to play monitoring 
and evaluation, as directly affected and concerned firms, industries and associations have access 
to information regarding the effectiveness of efforts to address specific trade-related bottlenecks 
and constraints.  
6.  Moving the Agenda Forward 
The G-20 is uniquely positioned to support specific actions to expand global trade. The fragile 
economic recovery – combined with the need to strengthen the international trading system in 
support of sustainable and inclusive growth and employment – place the aid for trade initiative at 
the forefront of policy importance. In addition to delivering on the commitments made in 
Gleneagles and Hong Kong on expanding aid for trade flows, there are four strategic themes that 
a G-20 “Action Agenda on Aid for Trade and Development” might support: 
1.  Establish a platform for capacity-building and transfer of knowledge to improve 
regulation of producer services and the operation of network infrastructure. A 
coordinated program of assistance and knowledge exchange that includes active 
involvement of middle income G20 countries could do much to increase the rate of return 
                                                            
27 See Volpe and Carballo (2008) for an evaluation of Peru’s export-promotion program. 22 
 
on aid for trade investments in hard infrastructure by creating a mechanism that will 
focus on strengthening capacity to put in place the associated complementary “software” 
inputs – policies, pro-competitive regulation, etc. – that are critical to realize both social 
(equity) objectives and improve the efficiency of use of network infrastructure. 
 
This is an agenda that goes beyond leveraging investments in infrastructure. It 
encompasses producer and business services more generally. An important factor that 
explains lack of progress in negotiations aimed at liberalization of trade and investment 
in services is uncertainty and concerns regarding the possible consequences of making 
market access commitments. Establishment of a forum that is aimed at substantive 
discussion and analysis of the impacts of liberalization and specific regulatory policies 
and policy changes could do much to build a common understanding of where there are 
indeed large gains from liberalization (Feketekuty, 2010; Hoekman and Messerlin, 2010).  
 
There is no existing institution that has an obvious comparative advantage in playing this 
role. One option could be to pursue a consortium approach, in which a number of policy 
institutes, international organizations and networks of regulators (such as the 
International Competition Network) from around the world combine to provide the 
needed knowledge resources and deliver the suggested services, working with or through 
a central hub entity that would be created. Such a “knowledge platform” would need a 
governance structure in which donor governments and other funders are represented. A 
possible model is the one that was used to establish the Global Development Network.  
 
2.  Complementing the financial aid for trade provided by high-income countries with 
market access reform by middle income G20 members to lower barriers to exports from 
poor countries so as to expand south-south trade. Extending duty-free, quota-free access 
for LDCs to all G20 members, with minimal exceptions, would constitute a concrete 
initiative that would directly promote the trade and development prospects of the poorest 
countries in the world. It is an initiative that is completely at the discretion of countries in 
that it can be done at the stroke of a pen. It would come at very low “cost” in terms of 
additional imports given that the production and trade structures of the LDCs and the G20 
countries have little overlap and that LDCs are in any event very small suppliers. Any 
DFQF initiative would need to be accompanied with liberal rules of origin and rules of 
cumulation—as has now been documented extensively, restrictive rules of origin can 
greatly reduce the effectiveness of DFQF programs. Concrete solutions to the rules of 
origin constraint have been developed by several importing countries and can be 
emulated by middle-income G20 members (see Elliott, 2010). 
 
3.  Creation of a new “public-private aid for trade partnership” to leverage the dynamism 
in the private sector for strengthening trade capacity in the countries that are recipients 
of aid for trade. Given the high payoffs from improving trade facilitation – encompassing 
areas from border management to regulatory reform and adoption of modern ICT 
technologies – such a partnership might focus initially on capitalizing on private sector 
expertise in prioritizing areas for reform and identifying potential solutions, while 
leveraging the coordinating capacities of governments and/or multilateral donor 
institutions. More generally, the focus could be on highlighting initiatives that are being 23 
 
implemented by firms and associations and sharing information on good practices and 
effective models of public-private partnerships that aim to leverage trade opportunities. 
 
4.  Joint action to provide dedicated financial support for a concerted program of 
monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade anchored in systematic data collection and 
research. All donors and recipients recognize the importance of monitoring and 
evaluation and analysis of trade outcomes and performance. The OECD is taking the lead 
in coordinating efforts to share the results of monitoring and evaluation by donors and 
agencies and to learn from experience. There is, however, no dedicated funding to ensure 
consistent cross-country collection of data on trade outcomes and their determinants on a 
comparable basis. While much knowledge is generated through ex post evaluation of 
projects, this does not result in datasets that allow for benchmarking of countries and 
tracking of performance over time. A concerted effort is needed to ensure that data are 
collected to allow the impacts of policy reform efforts and interventions to be compared 
across countries and over time. This will require agreement among governments and 
agencies on the specific indicators for which data should be compiled. Candidates include 
measures of trade costs – e.g., clearance/waiting times; the number of times that trucks 
are stopped along transport corridors; rejection or inspection rates of consignments at 
borders; trade diversification; and trade and investment policies (e.g., restrictiveness of 
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